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WHAT AN EXTENSION OF FREE SPEECH RIGHTS TO
ANIMALS MIGHT MEAN, DOCTRINALLY SPEAKING
VIKRAM DAVID AMARt

Professor Martha Nussbaum's Keynote Address and Essay, Why
Freedom of Speech Is an Important Right and Why Animals Should Have
It,' is characteristically ambitious, creative, thought-provoking, and important. And in my short comment on it I could never fully list, much less
explore, all the interesting ideas it contains. On top of that, I am a constitutional law scholar, not a philosopher, so I am not fully competent to engage some of Professor Nussbaum's interpretations of the relevant theories and texts (to say nothing of the biographical materials) in which she
is steeped and on which she draws. Accordingly, what I do in the space
below is simply pose a question and begin to explain-in constitutional
doctrinal terms (my own bailiwick)-why the answer might matter.
Taking as a given the seemingly incontrovertible notion (documented
by Professor Nussbaum) that John Stuart Mill cared deeply about the wellbeing of animals and wanted members of society to discuss and factor in
that well-being in their individual and collective decisions,2 my question
is this: Do Mill's ideas logically compel the notion that animals should
have legal rights of their own (vindicable through human legal representatives), or instead do Mill's views simply make clear that animals have
much to tell us, and that if we listen to them we will take away important
lessons about their welfare? 3 If the latter, narrower, reading is plausible,
we certainly can and should try hard to hear what nonhuman creatures
have to say as we take actions and craft laws with respect to overall welfare. But that is a different animal, so to speak, from the idea that nonhuman creatures themselves have, or should have, free speech rights in the
ordinary sense in which we constitutionalists invoke the term. It seems to
me that many of the passages in Mill's writings that Professor Nussbaum
explicates, and the Millian ideas on which she builds, could be quite consistent with both the narrower and the broader set of consequences, and
that from a philosophical standpoint the two endpoints might not be that
different. But constitutionally speaking, which of these paths we pursue

t Dean and Iwan Foundation Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law, Champaign Illinois. The author wishes to thank the staff of Denver Law Review for inviting him to attend
and participate in their symposium event held in Denver on Friday, February 9, 2018.
1.
Martha Nussbaum, Why Freedom ofSpeech Is an Important Right and Why Animals Should
Have It, 95 DENv. L. REV. 843 (2018).
2. Id. at 843, 847-48.
3.
I am indebted to fellow symposium participant and first-rate free speech scholar Heidi
Kitrosser for this framing.
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could have significant First Amendment implications. Professor Nussbaum, understandably, does not wade very deeply into doctrinal waters in
her offering, but I shall try to do that just a bit.
POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS FOR THE LAW OF STANDING

Let us begin with the legal doctrine of "standing," something that
Professor Nussbaum mentions briefly and as to which the consequences
of applying Mill narrowly or broadly are non-negligible but perhaps not
momentous.4 Professor Nussbaum argues (from Millian premises): "I
think the obvious thing is . .. that animals have standing. Mill's arguments
clearly imply that all harms are cognizable under the law.

. .

. Of course,

animals have to be represented by a lawyer or a guardian to go to court,
but they can do that, just as human beings with cognitive disabilities can
5
now go to court."

Under current doctrine, while people (including organizations of peo6
ple) can, if they satisfy certain requirements, enjoy legal standing, animals
and trees cannot. 7 But, importantly, people can obtain standing based on

their attitudes towards or their relationships with animals, trees, and other
parts of nature. So people often are able to establish standing, says the
Supreme Court, based on their desire to observe, study, worship, or make
8
material use of animals. Or based on their desire to simply experience and
9
enjoy animals or nature in particular settings. The inability of humans to
interact with animals-both domestic and wild-creates a cognizable in-

jury that comfortably suffices as a basis for standing under current doctrine. In fact, in a large percentage of the rulings where the Supreme Court
has rejected standing in disputes involving the natural environment, the
plaintiffs, for strategic long-term reasons or out of carelessness, have
simply neglected to specify or document in any meaningful way the rela-

tionship between humankind and animals or nature that is being impaired
or threatened by a defendant's conduct.io

&

Certainly Mill's insights and attitudes are relevant to current doctrine
even if we do not go so far as to confer independent standing on animals.
Taking Mill seriously-even if we read him narrowly-would, at the very
least, allow people to argue that they have standing to challenge practices
that reduce the amount of speech animals produce because the people want
to hear animals' voices. "I want to listen" to animals is just as important

4. See Nussbaum, supra note 1, at 849.
5. Id.
6. At least in federal court-I am using federal justiciability as the paradigm example of standing limitations, recognizing that state rules vary by state.
7. See generally Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? - Toward Legal Rights
for NaturalObjects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450, 450, 456 (1972).
8. E.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562-63 (1992); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405
U.S. 727, 734 (1972).
E.g., United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412
9.
U.S. 669, 678 (1973).
E.g., Defs. of Wildlfe, 504 U.S. at 564; Morton, 405 U.S. at 735.
10.
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an interest-the impairment of which constitutes a cognizable injury-as
"I want to hunt" animals, or "I want to study" animals, or "I want to worship" animals. At a minimum, then, current standing doctrine could incorporate Mill's insights to broaden the kind of relationships individuals can
plausibly assert to have human standing to challenge certain kinds of conduct that restrains animals. That expansion of current doctrine could be
meaningful but would also be incremental rather than revolutionary.
What if, by contrast, we read and apply Mill more broadly and ambitiously to embrace the notion that animals themselves have free speech
rights and standing (via human representatives) to assert those rights, such
that no human in court need allege any particular relationship to the animals in question? If we went that route, then anybody could sue (perhaps
seeking attorneys' fees in certain cases) claiming to be a guardian for animals. No person would need to allege, let alone document, any interest
relating to the animal speech that was allegedly constrained; he or she
would simply have to establish adequacy of representation. Perhaps, practically speaking, that would not be such a big change in the current state
of affairs either, since (as mentioned above) it is generally not hard to find
a person to serve as a plaintiff who could allege a desire to hear the animals
in question. And most would-be representatives, whether individual or organizational, could probably satisfy the relationship requirement doctrine
currently imposes if they pleaded the requisite facts specifically enough. I
suppose one significant change in current law resulting from a formal conferral of rights on the animals themselves might be the need for courts in
some cases to anticipate the effects a party's conduct might have on animals' ability to express themselves, and to appoint a representative in
cases where those animals' interests are at stake but where the court is not
sure that existing parties adequately have the animals' interests at heart.
Treating animals like minors in this regard would probably involve an expansion of the role of judges and lawyers in these matters.
POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MERITS OF FREE SPEECH / FIRST
AMENDMENT CLAIMS

But the really big doctrinal differences between a narrower or broader
application of Mill's ideas seem to emerge when we move from standing
to the merits of free speech cases. To see how, let us work our way through
the so-called "ag-gag" law context that Professor Nussbaum invokes."
About this, Professor Nussbaum says: "[T]here's going to be a very radical
principle here, which is that there should be no suppression of any kind of
human speech purporting to give information about the well-being of animals.... Any law limiting that kind of information would be a bad law."l 2
Certainly I do not take Professor Nussbaum here to mean that just
because a person is speaking about animal welfare, she is immune from
I1.

Nussbaum, supra note 1, at 849.

12.

Id.
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all regulation. A true threat against someone falls outside of First Amendment protection and thus can be punished even if the threat is premised on
13
an articulated and sincere desire to protect animals. And I doubt that Professor Nussbaum quarrels with that. To the extent that Professor Nussbaum is advocating here for a zero-tolerance policy concerning laws that
try to silence speakers based on an aversion 'to their animal-protective
message, the doctrine already reflects what Professor Nussbaum wants.
Using Professor Nussbaum's own words, current doctrine can accurately
be described to say: "[a]ny law limiting [speech based on any particular]
kind of information [whether about animal welfare or any other topic is] a
bad law" insofar as it is content- or viewpoint-based and thus already subject to strict scrutiny. 14
This should cause us to wonder: On the question of ag-gag laws,
would choosing between the two different Millian applications matter? In
many instances, the answer would be no. As mentioned above, it is already
clear that the government cannot punish the expression of materials concerning animal cruelty because lawmakers disfavor that content. Similarly,
the government cannot single out information-collection tactics relating to
animal cruelty and punish them specially because the government does not
want that particular kind of information to be known or disseminated.
Laws of both of those types violate the near-absolute constitutional ban on
content- or viewpoint-based regulation of expression. And this is true
whether animals have rights or not. As long as people care about and want
to learn and talk about animal cruelty (which they would even under the
narrower, nonrights, application of Mill), then laws designed to target and
punish information collection and dissemination about this particular topic
are, to use Professor Nussbaum's word, "bad." And that would be so if we
substituted human cruelty for animal cruelty as the disfavored topic. What
drives the doctrine here is not so much why the individuals are wanting to
collect information and speak, but why the government is regulating. Animals do not need to have rights for us to frown on regulation that is motivated by a desire to suppress certain messages or messengers.
The more difficult question posed by some of the more carefully
crafted ag-gag regulations is what we can infer, based on the government's
site-specific regulation of animal slaughter places, about censorial motive.

13.

See generally R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381, 383 (1992).

See Nussbaum, supra note 1, at 849.
14.
In this regard, consider Professor Nussbaum's important point that symbolic conduct such
15.
as flag burning-and not just oral human speech-counts under the First Amendment. See id at 843.
But most cases in which regulation of symbolic conduct has been struck down involve situations in
which government is regulating the conduct because of its symbolic expressive character. What matters is why the government is regulating; a ban on flag burning is much harder to uphold than a ban
on cloth burning that might include the burning of many flags. When government regulates symbolic
conduct for reasons having nothing to do with expression, then the courts apply a more lenient standard. (More on that below.) See id
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Do these laws, by targeting certain modes of information collection at certain locales, evince a legislative motive to target particular subjects or
points of view such that they should be viewed as content- or viewpointbased at all?
Sometimes the government regulates a site and expressive activity
that takes place on or near it not because the speech is likely to involve a
particular subject matter or viewpoint but because that kind of site is where
there have been certain kinds of problems (e.g., interference with mobility,
violence, trespass, etc.) that the government has a legitimate interest in
regulating.1 So if the problem of improper trespass or fraudulent entry or
invasion of privacy is particularly pronounced in certain places like
slaughterhouses, and those are problems that can be regulated without fear
that the government is censoring, then many would argue we should not
apply strict scrutiny to some laws that single out those venues. But if the
context and phrasing of a particular law suggest that the site and kinds of
regulation were chosen with an eye toward certain messages, then we
should be very skeptical indeed of the law.
Yet even if we do not suspect that "official suppression of ideas is
afoot," 7 we generally apply a meaningful level of review (though not strict
scrutiny) to laws that have the effect of burdening human expression in a
meaningful way.' 8 And it is in these kinds of settings where the choice
between applying the two Millian interpretations matters a lot.
The Court uses a pair of doctrinal formulations to assess situations in
which the government is not regulating in a content- or viewpoint-based
way, but is regulating in such a way as to potentially dampen or reduce the
amount of human speech that is allowed.1 9 Again, the test under both these
formulations is not strict scrutiny, but it is also not a rubber stamp.20 And
under either of these formulations, a doctrinal recognition that animals
have free speech rights of their own could have very significant consequences.
Under one formulation, as it was articulated by the Court in Ward v.
Rock Against Racism,21 when the government regulates what is conventionally thought of as expressive activity but does so by means of a content-neutral law, the Court insists that the content-neutral regulation of the
time, place or manner of speech be "narrowly tailored to serve a significant
governmental interest, and . . . leave open ample alternative channels for
communication of the information." 2 2 A second formulation is typically
16.
17.

See McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2530-33 (2014).
R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 390.

18.
19.
20.

See infra notes 19-25 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.

21.
22.

491 U.S. 781 (1989).
Id. at 791 (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)).
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invoked when the regulation involves activity that may not generally be
thought of as expressive but which some individuals might engage in for
23
expressive purposes (e.g., sleeping in public, burning items, etc.). in
cases involving the use of conventionally nonexpressive conduct to
communicate a message, like the famous O'Brien v. United States24 draftcard-burning case, the Court puts the test as follows: "[The law must]
further[] an important or substantial governmental interest . .. unrelated to
the suppression of free expression, and . . . the incidental restriction on
alleged First Amendment freedom [must be] no greater than is essential to
25
the furtherance of that interest."
The two formulations are similar, but not identical. The empirical
data, which accords with many scholars' common-sense intuitions, would
26
suggest that under the O'Brien formulation, fewer laws are struck down.
But under both tests-and this is the key-if animals were granted free
speech rights themselves, many more laws would be in jeopardy of invalidation. In the ag-gag context, for example, if we found no censorship but
viewed the law as a content-neutral regulation of a place (slaughterhouses)
and manner (use of some less-than-candid means) of information collection and speech, we would apply the Ward test today and ask whether the
ban on certain sharp practices would prevent people from getting their
message out. The answer might be "no" to the extent that there are other
(albeit perhaps somewhat more expensive) ways for people to collect and
disseminate the information in question. But if we asked whether a ban on
information collection practices would prevent people or the specific animals at the facility from getting their particular message out, the answer
might be different. People might be able to get the information concerning
animal conditions from other sources and disseminate it; the particular animals in question could not themselves get their message out if people are
prevented from hearing them.
So too if we apply the O'Brien test; if the speech on which a regulation has an effect includes animals' ability to convey information about
themselves, then whether the regulation restricts animals' speech "no more
than is essential" to the government's interest often becomes a much
harder question to answer.
Indeed, if we say animals actually have speech rights, then arguably
we have an obligation to accommodate or facilitate animal speech in settings well beyond ag-gag laws. For example, all kinds of laws and regulations that, on their face, do not focus on expressive activities will nonetheless incidentally make it harder for animals, but not necessarily people, to
speak. Take regulations that authorize the government to construct a road

23.
24.
25.

See, e.g., O'Brien v. United States, 39 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
391 U.S. 367 (1968).
Id. at 377.

26.

See, e.g., Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Test That Ate Everything: Intermediate Scrutiny in First

Amendment Jurisprudence,2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 782, 792 (2007).
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as just one example. The construction of many roads will destroy the habitat for many individual animals, making it hard for them to live, let alone
express themselves. Right now, we would not judge such a project under
any First Amendment standard, since the project would not have foreseeable speech-constraining implications for persons. But under O'Brien,
would the First Amendment require government to minimize environmental-habitat impacts because the incidental suppression of some animals'
speech is larger than it had to be? Would we, in effect, be broadening and
constitutionalizing environmental law protections in the name of the First
Amendment? I do not have answers to these questions, but they are the
kinds of interesting ones that we might need to confront if we embrace the
broader application of Mill's ideas and try to enshrine it into constitutional
law and the discourse of rights.

